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I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO AND
REQUEST THAT THE STATE BE PRECLUDED FROM
PLAYING THE EXCERPTS OF THE JAIL CALLS FOR
THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION.
The State claims that Mr. Wilson “has not overcome the strong presumption that his
counsel performed effectively” in handling the recordings of various jail phone calls played
by the State for the jury.  See Brief of Appellee, p. 29, et seq.  This claim, however, fails
due to a number of significant omissions and miscalculations in the State’s analysis – as
demonstrated below.
Part and parcel with this claim, the State contends that “[c]ompetent counsel could
reasonably conclude that a rule 403 objection was unlikely to succeed.”  See id., p. 32.  The
argument presented in support of this contention omits a number of critical facts and
considerations of law.
While relevant1 evidence is generally admissible,2 rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence provides an exception to this general rule by stating that “[t]he court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
1Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.”  See Utah R. Evid. 401.
2See Utah R. Evid. 402; see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah
1993) (explaining that courts “indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility”).
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more of the following:  unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Thus, rule 403 – at its heart – is a balancing test.  See State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984
(Utah 1989).
 Mr. Wilson recognizes – as demonstrated in his opening Brief – that rule 403
“imposes . . . the heavy burden not only to show that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater
than the probative value, but that it ‘substantially outweighs’ the probative value.”  State
v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 29, 345 P.3d 1195 (brackets omitted).   Evidence, for purposes of
the rule, is unfairly prejudicial when it has “‘an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Maurer, 770 P.2d
at 984 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s notes).  Further, “even if a trial
court improperly admits unfairly prejudicial or cumulative evidence, [the appellate court]
will not overturn a jury verdict based on that evidence if the admission of the evidence did
not reasonably [affect] the likelihood of a different verdict.”  State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT
10, ¶ 36, 345 P.3d 1168 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to the State’s assertion, our supreme court’s decision in Maurer is
particularly relevant to the analysis in this case.  In Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), the
Utah Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction on the basis of the State’s introduction
of an inflammatory letter at trial written by the defendant to the victim’s father.  See
Maurer, 770 P.2d at 987.  In the letter, the defendant ridiculed and taunted the victim’s
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father by stating, “You might have prevented [the murder].  I hope you feel guilt over it.” 
Id. at 982.  In addition, the defendant wrote, “It was a great feeling to watch her die.”  Id.
Defense counsel – prior to trial – filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from
introducing the letter into evidence during trial.  See id.  The trial court denied the motion
based on a determination that the letter was probative of defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the homicide.  See id.  Defense counsel argued that even if the letter had some
relevance as to the defendant’s state of mind, the prejudicial effect far exceeded its potential
relevance under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.  See id. at 983.
The supreme court reversed the conviction, determining that the letter “display[ed]
[Maurer’s] callousness toward the killing which he expresses in profane and vulgar
language and manifests his complete insensitivity to this tragedy.”  Id.  The Court held that
even though portions of the letter were relevant to the defendant’s guilt, the trial court erred
in admitting the entire letter because the “balance” of it contained “little or no relevance to
the central issue and that any relevance . . . was greatly and clearly outweighed by the
danger of ‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the jury.’”  Id. (citing
Utah R. Evid. 403).  The Court noted the danger of “a conviction based on a generalized
assessment of character” when “the conversation includes obscenities, ethnic slurs, and
otherwise coarse language, warped and suffused with an aura of nonspecific criminality .
. . .”  Id. at 985; cf. State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ¶¶ 44-51, 352 P.3d 107.
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Here,  the excerpts of the recorded jail phone calls played by the State at trial
displayed an extreme callousness by Mr. Wilson towards the stabbing of D.H., which he
expresses in profane and vulgar language, manifesting his complete insensitivity to the
injuries inflicted upon D.H.  For instance, during one excerpt, Mr. Wilson – referring to the
victim, D.H. – stated,
I am not [D.H.].  I don’t call the cops to help me out with shit. 
I handle shit like a man, on my own.  People . . . fuck me, I
eliminate them real quick.  It’s over and done with.  If I was
out there right now, it would be a whole different [inaudible].
(See SR3:9-13).3  This callousness is further demonstrated by another excerpt where Mr. 
Wilson stated, “Yeah.  Because um, I’m going to play it cool, like you know what I’m
saying and I can’t do too much talking, but I have no problem taking somebody’s life, at
all.  So that’s not a big deal to me, it really isn’t.” (See SR4:11-14).  In another excerpt,
which includes one of many racial slurs, Mr. Wilson states, “I’m not him, I don’t go on
Facebook and portray something I’m not.  I really put niggers down, y’all.  I really – I really
have the capacity to kill somebody, you understand?  And think nothing of it.” (See SR8:5-
8).
Even more troubling are excerpts played by the State that not only indicate extreme
callousness but a shocking lack of remorse for D.H. with an almost psychopathic repulsive
treatment of him.  For example, the State played an excerpt where Mr. Wilson – referring
3A true and correct copy of the Supplemental Record SR1-37 - Transcript: 
Powerpoint Audio (Jail Phone Call Excerpts) is attached to this Brief as Addendum A.
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to the incident – stated, “I’m like whatever.  So I’m not even tripping off of it and if he tries
something, I’m going to put this nigger in the hospital, I don’t care.  So that’s how I’m
laughing.” (See SR23:1-4).  In another excerpt, Mr. Wilson stated:
I clearly knew – know my surroundings when I’m stabbing
somebody the fuck up.  I was prepared, he wasn’t.  He lost. 
He’s mad about it . . . . .  He got handled, dog, straight East
Coast style.  He thought I was one of these Utah motherfuckers
that I was going to tell the cops, or get bitch slapped or some
shit like that, and he got stabbed the fuck up.  What do – what
do you want me to say?
(See SR30-31).
Equally troubling are the excerpts played by the State that demonstrate derogatory
comments and extreme amounts of callousness towards V.N., a nonparty to the criminal
proceedings, not to mention women in general.4  In one of the excerpts, Mr. Wilson – in the
course of arguing with V.N. – stated:
So I don’t – I don’t – I don’t know what to tell you.  Shouldn’t
have to fucking . . . physically threaten you so you don’t hang
out with another dude.  And that’s why we not – that’s why I
would never say to you in that type of situation.  I hope you
bump into a rich, rich white dude that doesn’t mind fat girls
because that’s what – that’s what you going to get.  Because
I’m not – I’m not marrying you, not with – I shouldn’t have to
fucking force you to do some shit like this.
(See SR7:11-20).  Mr. Wilson, in another excerpt, during another argument with V.N.,
states, “Okay then.  And I’m trying to convey the fucking message and your punk ass is
4In its Brief, the State claims that the jury did not hear Mr. Wilson’s “vulgar
expressions toward” V.N.  See Brief of Appellee, p. 34 n.6.  This is not true.
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over there typing some bullshit for your fucking job.” (See SR17:6-8).  In another, Mr.
Wilson – getting frustrated with V.N. – states, “He’s only been talking like – like he tough
Tony since I got in jail, you stupid motherfucker. (See SR29:6-8; see also SR11:9-11
(stating “I don’t do shit but fuck bitches, chop, and get money.  Why would somebody be
made at me?  Unless it’s over the money that I’m getting or the bitches that I’m fucking.”);
SR22:22-24 (stating “I had just been chilling with Amanda fucking her all weekend, so I
don’t really give a fuck.  I’m like whatever bitch.”); SR26:16-18 (stating in reference to his
T.D.’s pregnancy, “I’m trying to make amends with you.  You ain’t having it.  I’m telling
you I’m telling [T.D.] to kill the kid so we can work things out with us.”)).
A large portion of the foregoing excerpts also demonstrate a warped and suffused
aura of nonspecific criminality.  This is also indicated in other excerpts played by the State. 
For example, Mr. Wilson states in one such excerpt, “So the roommate was this gay guy
that I didn’t like.  Like, I didn’t like him.. He would always say little slick racist shit.  I done
already smacked him up and everything.” (See SR19:16-18; see also SR29-30 (stating “If
somebody stabbed me, I’d kill them.  That’s it.  Serious.”; SR31:7 (stating “Because
everything that I got a problem with, I go handle shit.”)).
Based on the foregoing, the balance of the recordings were likely highly
inflammatory in the eyes of the jury.  Considering the statements made during the excerpts,
it would be difficult to imagine expressions that would be more repulsive to the notion of
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the value of human life than those made by Mr. Wilson during the jail phone calls utilized
by the State.
The State claims in its Brief that Mr. Wilson’s opening Brief “glosses over the high
probative value of the jail clips, focusing only on the potential risk they may have had.”  See
Brief of Appellee, p. 37.  This is not true and demonstrated by the argument set forth on
page 30 of the Brief of Appellant.
The balance of the jail recordings contained little or no relevance to the central
issues and any relevance that could be found therein was greatly and clearly outweighed by
the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the jury.”  See
Maurer, 770 P.2d at 983 (citing Utah R. Evid. 403).  The overwhelming weight of this
danger is underscored by the fact that the State had other evidence available to prove Mr.
Wilson’s state of mind and to rebut his defense of others argument.  See State v. Cloud, 722
P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1986) (holding it was reversible error to admit photograph showing
allegedly obscene gesture by a homicide victim as motivation for killing when evidence of
gesture could have been presented to the jury readily by other means).  The failure of trial
counsel to ultimately pursue an objection and request that the State be precluded from
playing the recordings for the jury’s consideration constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
While a defense lawyer “navigating a criminal proceeding faces any number of
choices about how best to make a client’s case”, the lawyer – under Strickland – “has
7
discharged his constitutional responsibility so long as his decisions fall within the ‘wide
range of professionally competent assistance.’”  Buck v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct.
759, 775 (2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052
(1984)).  “It is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment’ that Strickland‘s first
prong is satisfied.’”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
Notwithstanding the State’s claim, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did not
pursue an objection and request that the State be precluded from playing the jail phone call
recordings for the jury’s consideration.  Trial counsel was aware of the content of the jail
recordings5 and was thus aware of the extremely prejudicial content contained in the
recordings that displays Mr. Wilson’s callousness towards the stabbing, which he expressed
in profane and vulgar language and thereby manifested a complete insensitivity to the tragic
event.  In fact, the excerpts demonstrated a shocking lack of remorse by Mr. Wilson and the
repulsiveness of his expressions toward the victim and V.N., a nonparty to the criminal
proceedings, and women in general.
Trial counsel had ample opportunity to determine that the prejudicial content of the
jail recordings were in direct conflict with the primary defense theory that the stabbing
occurred in the defense of others, namely, Mr. Wilson’s girlfriend and his unborn child. 
5See R. 1159:3-4 (trial counsel conceding that he reviewed the jail phone calls); R.
1164:17-18 (State representing to court that recordings were provided to trial counsel
prior to trial); R. 1255:1-2).
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Under the circumstances, reasonable trial counsel would have objected and moved to
preclude the recordings from being heard and considered by the jury.
As a touchstone for any ineffective assistance of counsel issue like that in this case,
there is no reasonable trial strategy that could explain trial counsel’s performance in failing
to object and request that the State be precluded from playing the recordings.  See State v.
Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶¶ 25-30, 349 P.3d 676 (“there is no reasonable strategy that could
explain trial counsel’s performance” in not requesting a jury instruction that would serve
as the very basis of primary theory of the defense).  No reasonable trial counsel would have
found an advantage by allowing the repulsive statements of Mr. Wilson to be utilized by the
State; statements that not only directly undermined the defense-of-others defense at trial but
inserted the danger of “a conviction based on a generalized assessment of character” with
conversations that included “obscenities, ethnic slurs, and otherwise coarse language,
warped and suffused with an aura of nonspecific criminality . . . .”  Maurer, 770 P.2d at
985.  There existed only an upside in the preclusion of the repulsive statements particularly
when the primary defense theory at trial was the defense of others.
The State – in its Brief – downplays counsel’s unfulfilled promise during his opening
statement to the jury.  See Brief of Appellee, p. 46 et seq.  In that statement, trial counsel
addressed the jail phone recordings by stating the following:
You’re going to hear conversations.  You are going to hear
telephone recordings from my client.  And you’re going to hear
language that most of you may not have heard, or maybe you
have heard but don’t like. . . .  One thing you need to
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understand, that I hope we can get out there to you, are these
phone calls from an individual who is in jail; who is trying to
puff himself up. . . .  My client, talking to individuals on the
phone, says things that are absolutely not true in order to make
himself seem tougher and better and bigger than what he really
is.
(R. 622:5-24 (emphasis added)).  Counsel – by stating that the things said by Mr. Wilson
on the jail phone call recordings “are absolutely not true” – implicitly promised a
presentation of evidence that demonstrated as much.  This is critical in light of the court’s
instruction to the jury that “[s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are not
evidence . . . .” (See Jury Instruction No. 33, R. 291).
“The failure of counsel to produce evidence which he promised the jury during his
opening statement that he would produce is indeed a damaging failure sufficient of itself
to support a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.”  McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159,
166-67 (3rd Cir. 1993) (citing Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871, 879 (7th Cir. 1990) (Sixth
Amendment violation where defense counsel failed to call witnesses who he claimed in
opening statement would support defense version of shooting)); see also State v. Zaborski,
59 N.Y.2d 863, 465 N.Y.S.2d 927, 452 N.E.2d 1255, 1256-57 (1983) (mem.) (unfulfilled
promise to produce entrapment evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel);
Commonwealth v. Lambeth, 273 Pa.Super. 460, 417 A.2d 739, 740 (1979) (per curiam)
(unfulfilled promise to produce evidence that the defendant and the victim had argued and
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that the victim had threatened the defendant determined to be ineffective assistance of
counsel).6
Trial counsel essentially promised a presentation of evidence that would demonstrate
Mr. Wilson’s statements made in the jail recordings “are absolutely not true.” 
Notwithstanding V.N.’s7 testimony at trial that Mr. Wilson was “very put together and
eloquent” and that he – during the jail phone calls – did not make any threats that she “took
serious,”8 trial counsel failed to present any evidence that addressed Mr. Wilson’s
callousness towards the stabbing, lack of remorse for the victims, his repulsive treatment
of V.N., a nonparty to the proceedings, or the referenced nonspecific criminal behavior. 
Further, counsel never presented any evidence to disprove Mr. Wilson’s statement that he
needed to make up “a good reason as to why [his] life was in danger” during the
confrontation with D.H. because his version “doesn’t sound believable.” (State’s Exhibit
No. 63; R. 1169:6-10; R. 1169:12 et seq.).
6In a footnote, the State challenges this “extra-jurisdictional authority” as without
“the necessary factual predicate for his ineffectiveness claim.”  See Brief of Appellee, p.
49 n.8.  The factual predicate is demonstrated, as discussed above, by the plain language
of trial counsel’s opening statement that is difficult to interpret in any other way.  In
addition, the legal principles upon which the authorities cited above rely are sound for
purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.




The failure to object and request that the recordings be precluded from the jury’s
consideration fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and constituted a failure
to advocate on Mr. Wilson’s behalf.  There is no sound course of trial strategy that would
dictate trial counsel to be silent at such a crucial time as the State’s presentation of jail
recordings containing little or no relevance to the central issues and any relevance that was
greatly and clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
and misleading the jury.  See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1991)
(holding that “[n]o sound course of trial strategy could dictate defense counsel to be silent
at such a crucial time”).
A defendant must also demonstrate prejudice under Strickland by showing “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  There
are many considerations that demonstrate that the proceeding would have ended differently
in this case.  If trial counsel had objected and moved to preclude the State from playing the
jail phone call recordings for the jury, the court – in light of the Maurer decision – would
have precluded the recordings from being considered by the jury.
Trial counsel’s failure to object and request that the recordings be precluded from
the jury’s consideration undermined the primary defense theory at trial that the stabbing
occurred in the defense of others.  This is demonstrated by Mr. Wilson’s statement during
one of the recordings that he needed to make up “a good reason as to why [his] life was in
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danger” during the confrontation with D.H. because his version “doesn’t sound believable”
(SR6:14-16; R. 1169:6-10; R. 1169:12 et seq.).  The State underscored this at trial by
essentially arguing that Mr. Wilson’s statement proves that the defense of others claim was
fabricated (See R. 1239:1-8).  Additionally, the State contended that Mr. Wilson’s
statements in the jail calls demonstrate that “[h]e wasn’t concerned for T.D. that night.” (R.
1230:9-20).
Trial counsel’s failures created what the jury might have considered as bearing the
defense’s imprimatur.  The recordings – after all – constituted Mr. Wilson’s own statements
that he made with the knowledge that the jail phone calls were being recorded and
monitored (R. 1153-54 (testimony by Chief Webb that the jail system for inmate calls puts
both parties on notice that the call is being recorded and monitored).
Trial counsel’s failure to present evidence that Mr. Wilson’s statements in the jail
recordings “are absolutely not true” also prejudiced Mr. Wilson.  The implied promise that
there would be a presentation of evidence in this regard created an expectation in the minds
of jurors, and when defense counsel without explanation failed to keep that promise, the
jury may well have inferred that the testimony was adverse to Mr. Wilson and may have
also questioned trial counsel’s credibility.  See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach,
347 F.3d 219, 259 (7th Cir. 2003).  By priming the jury to hear a different version of Mr.
Wilson’s statements from what was ultimately presented, the reasonable juror quite
probably inferred that the apparent failure to present evidence was due to witnesses being
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unwilling or unable to deliver the testimony he promised.  See Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d
16, 18 (1st Cir.1988).  This in no way served Mr. Wilson’s interests; thereby prejudicing
the entire case against him.
Trial counsel’s misstep is reasonably likely to have affected the verdict.  See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  While the jury did not accept Mr. Wilson’s
defense of others argument, this does not foreclose the probability that had the jury not
heard the jail recordings it could reasonably have acquitted Mr. Wilson of attempted murder
and convicted him of either attempted manslaughter or even aggravated assault.
The record shows that the jury heard two different accounts of the events leading to
the stabbing of D.H.  Had the jury not heard the jail recording statements of Mr. Wilson,
there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial.  The jail phone call
statements painted Mr. Wilson with an extraordinary amount of callousness towards the
tragic event, a shocking lack of remorse for D.H., and an almost psychopathic repulsive
treatment of D.H. and V.N., a non party to the criminal proceedings.  Worst of all, perhaps,
is the statement of Mr. Wilson in the jail recordings that he needed to formulate a new
defense demonstrated untruthfulness as to the claim that the stabbing occurred in the
defense of T.D. and his unborn child.
Upon objecting and requesting that the State be precluded from playing the jail
recordings for the jury, there is a reasonable probability that the jail recordings, at least in
large part, would have been preluded from the jury’s consideration.  There is a reasonable
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probability that the recordings would have been precluded from consideration by the jury
and that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.  “[A] showing of
innocence is not required.”  Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002).
The failure of trial counsel to reasonably object and request that the jail recordings
be precluded from the jury’s consideration was deficient and in turn prejudiced Mr.
Wilson’s primary defense theory at trial.  By failing to object and request preclusion of the
recordings, trial counsel did not act as reasonably competent counsel, did not protect Mr.
Wilson’s rights to due process, and did not zealously represent his interests prior to and
during trial.  Because the statements in the jail recordings directly undermined the primary
defense theory at trial, they – not to mention the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, [and] misleading the jury” – affected the overall consideration of the jury’s
deliberations; thereby affecting essentially the “entire evidentiary picture” at trial.  See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
II. BY FAILING TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER, TRIAL COUNSEL
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
The State argues that Mr. Wilson “has not overcome the strong presumption that trial
counsel’s strategic decisions” in foregoing an instruction on the lesser-included offense of
attempted manslaughter.  See Brief of Appellee, p. 50 et seq.  This argument is without
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merit in light of circumstances of the instant, which includes trial counsel’s failures set forth
in Argument I.
The evidence in the instant case was ambiguous or subject to alternative
interpretation requiring the court to instruct on the lesser offense of attempted
manslaughter.  When the evidence is susceptible to alternative interpretations, the trial court
is obligated to give a lesser included offense instruction if any of those alternative
interpretations would provide both a “rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.”  See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(4).  As specifically demonstrated in the opening Brief, the trial court in the
instant case would have been obligated to give a lesser included offense instruction under
the facts and circumstances of this case had such an instruction been requested by trial
counsel.  See & cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(a) & (c); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205.5(1)(b).
In light of the circumstances outlined in detail above, it is difficult to conceive of a
sound trial strategy that would justify trial counsel’s decision not to request a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter.  This is particularly
so because trial counsel’s failure to object and request that the excerpts of the jail
recordings precluded the jury from considering the primary defense theory at trial that the
stabbing occurred in the defense of others.  As a result, trial counsel should have requested
the court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.  See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
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205(1)(a) (homicide constitutes manslaughter if death recklessly caused) and State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 262-64 (Utah 1988); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-205(1)(c)
& 76-5-205.5(1)(b) (homicide or attempt mitigated if under influence of extreme emotional
distress) and State v. Lambdin, 2017 UT 46, ¶¶ 15-33, 424 P.3d 117).  By failing to do so,
trial counsel failed to address the lesser-included offense issue under the facts and
circumstances of this case.  Consequently, trial counsel’s failures are sufficiently egregious
to support the conclusions that trial counsel’s decision cannot be considered a “sound trial
strategy,” as required by Strickland, and that defense counsel’s performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness set forth in Strickland.  This is demonstrated by
existing Utah case law, the plain and mandatory language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402,
and the underlying factual circumstances and evidence in this case.  See & cf. State v.
Gillian, 463 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1970).
But for counsel’s unprofessional failure to request a lesser included offense
instruction, the result of Mr. Wilson’s trial would have been different.  Had trial counsel
requested a lesser included offense instruction for attempted manslaughter, there is a
reasonable probability that the court would have instructed the jury accordingly.  By
instructing the jury on the lesser included offense, the jury would have effectively been
provided with the availability of a “third option” – the choice of conviction of a lesser
offense rather than conviction of the greater or acquittal.  The prejudice to Mr. Wilson
resulting from this critical failure is evinced by the fact that he was denied the full benefit
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of the reasonable doubt standard in the course of the jury arriving at his conviction for
attempted murder.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
convictions and remand for a new trial as the Court deems just and appropriate under the
circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of November, 2019.
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
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